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Gone with the War?  Neutral State Responsibility  
and the Geneva Arbitration of 1872 
 
 
Neutral Countries … may be exploited by the Great Powers both 
strategically and as a source of additional armies and fleets. Of central 
importance to the game are those Neutral Countries and provinces  
which are designated as “Supply Centres”.   ... .  A player’s fighting 
strength is directly related to the number of Supply Centres he or she 






War can be ‘kind’ to certain sectors of an economy2 and the armed forces of a state 
can be as easily employed arguably to protect domestic trade as to face an external 
armed threat.  With this point in mind, the arbitral award of $l5,500,0003 made to 
the United States against Great Britain on 14 September 1872 is of crucial and 
historic importance. The arbitration was held in Geneva pursuant to the Washington 
Treaty of 8 May 1871, and was intended to settle various differences which had arisen 
largely during the American Civil War (‘ACW’), 1861 – 1865.4  Propelling the 
                                              
1 Excerpt from the rules of the popular board-game ‘Diplomacy’ [1989] Gibson Games, in 
which players re-enact European war-mongering prior to World War 1.  Eighteen ‘Supply 
Centres’ constitute a majority of the 34 Supply Centres marked on the board. 
2 See G. Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770 – 1870 (Stroud, Sutton 
Publishing Ltd., 1998), p. 138. 
3 Plus interest payable by Britain. The amount originally claimed was $34.75 million.  
J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective:  The Law of Neutrality, Vol. X 
Part IX-B (Alphen aan den Rijn, l979), p. 118.  
4 Text of Treaty reprinted in J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, Vol. 1 (Washington:  
Government Printing Office, 1898), pp. 547 – 553. Articles I – XI of the Treaty regarded 
the so-called ‘Alabama’ claims. Other claims involved (1) the navigation of the St. 
Lawrence river, (2) fisheries disputes, (3) transit of goods through Maine, lumber trade 
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arbitration were American accusations that Great Britain had assisted the new 
Confederacy covertly in its rebellion, and in breach of British neutrality.  In particular, 
Great Britain had declared neutrality soon after the outbreak of the ACW, as had 
many other European states, but British shipbuilding for or on behalf of the Southern 
Confederacy during the war was a prime complaint.5   
 
The laws of armed neutrality6 have a long history, as the practice of third states 
remaining neutral during times of war was derivative of the fact of war.  Serious 
attempts by states to deter or prevent each other from engaging in war only began in 
the last hundred years or so.7 Thus, by the late Nineteenth Century, the rules of 
neutrality had crystalised into two main principles, those of abstention and 
impartiality.  First, neutral states were entitled to continue with their peaceful trade 
during a war. Secondly, belligerent states were entitled, for wartime purposes, to 
monitor certain forms of trade in order to prevent the delivery of prohibited 
contraband to an enemy.8  Therefore, the law of neutrality permitted the continuation 
of neutral peacetime trade during a military war without the neutral having to ally 
with a belligerent.9   This did nothing to prevent war; it merely helped to confine 
                                                                                                                             
down the St. John River and reciprocal trade between the U.S. and the Dominion of 
Canada, (4) the Manitoba boundary, (5) the San Juan water boundary, (6) British 
claims arising from the ACW, and (7) Canadian claims for Fenian raids.  See, e.g., J.T. 
Adams, A History of the American People (London:  Routledge, 1933), pp. 141 – 144; 
J.B. Moore, above, this note, pp. 539, 540 - 541. 
5 The Tribunal would examine a total of l8 such claims. 
6 By which is meant neutrality made applicable during war, rather than a stance of 
neutrality pronounced during a time of peace. 
7 Fuelled in part by the need to harness new military technology.  I.P. Trainin, 
‘Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War’ [1946] 40 A.J.I.L. 534, 536 n.2.  
See also G. Best, ‘The Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Perspective’, in 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict – Challenges Ahead (A.J.M. Delissen and G.J. 
Tanja, eds.) (Dordrecht:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 3, 19; General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War 1928, U.K.T.S. 29 (1929), Cmnd. 3410, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
8 F.E. Smith (Earl of Birkenhead), International Law (London:  Dent (The Temple Primers), 
1900), p. 145.  See also Y. Dinstein, ‘The Laws of Neutrality’ [1984] l4 Isr. Y.B.H.R. 80. 
9 See, e.g., C.H. Stockton, ‘The Declaration of Paris’ [1920] 14 A.J.I.L. 357, who refers to 
the Crimean War (1853 – 1856) as ‘in fact, a practical example of that anomaly of “a 
military war and a commercial peace”’. No lawful trade could be conducted between the 
citizens of states at war with each other, without special permission. G.G. Wilson (ed.), H. 
Wheaton’s Elements of International Law:  the Literal Reproduction of the Edition of 1866 
by R.H. Dana, Jr. [‘Dana’] (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 358. 
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war’s effects.  Moreover, as a breach of neutral duties by one state could place 
serious diplomatic pressure on its neighbours, it was in the interests of the 
international community to ensure observance of the rules of neutrality by both 
belligerents and neutrals.   
 
However, and in step with steady technological progress,10 neutral states were forced 
slowly to devote greater efforts to policing their neutrality.  Higher levels of neutral 
state ‘due diligence’ were demanded as the price for remaining uninvolved. To do 
otherwise meant risking the appearance of aiding one belligerent to the detriment of 
the other.  However, as higher levels of ‘due diligence’ came to be expected from 
neutrals, a contradiction at the heart of Nineteenth Century neutrality, and thus at 
the heart of the bases for arbitration at Geneva, was exposed. Continued trade 
between a neutral and a belligerent could secure a corresponding degree of advantage 
to each.11 At what point, then, would a ‘practical example of that anomaly of a military 
war and a commercial peace’12 operate in practice to the advantage of one belligerent, 
and the disadvantage of another? At what point could ‘neutral’ trade become 
‘un-neutral’ service?  At what point could a mere perception of un-neutral activity be 
serious enough to trigger a declaration of war by an aggrieved belligerent upon that 
neutral?   
 
In short, while rules of neutrality were indeed a fact of international life, their precise 
content was not.  The observance of any particular set of rules was designed more to 
secure a stance of neutrality within given circumstances than to express ‘disapproval’ 
of a war.  As a decision to declare neutrality involved cost-benefit considerations as 
well, such as whether and to what extent a belligerent state might secure ‘natural’ 
advantages from geographic position, or historic trade links,13 consideration had also 
to be given to modes of ‘permissible’ assistance. The tasks, therefore, of the Geneva 
arbitrators in 1872 included re-defining the modern content of ‘due diligence’, 
assessing for purposes of compensation the many claims for damage allegedly caused 
                                              
10 For instance, the use of the telegraph, railways, steamships, and new armaments.  See, 
e.g., A. Haughton, ‘Braxton Bragg and Training in the Army of Tennessee 1861 – 1863’ 
[1998] 3(2) War Studies Journal 96; I.P. Trainin, supra note 7. 
11 Cf. the recent furore surrounding Swiss ‘neutrality’ during World War 2.  See Book 
Review, de Waal, ‘Dangers of Discretion’ [1999] 21(2) London Review of Books 27. 
12 C.H. Stockton, supra, note 9. 
13 See F.A. Boyle, ‘International Crisis and Neutrality:  U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the 
Iraq-Iran War’, in Neutrality:  Changing Concepts and Practices (A.T. Leonhard, ed.) 
(London:  University Press of America, 1988), pp. 59, 64; E.C. Phillips, ‘American 
Participation in Belligerent Commercial Controls 1914 – 1917’ [1933] 27 A.J.I.L. 675. 
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by the breach of neutrality by Great Britain,14 and facilitating an agreement between 
the parties regarding operative rules for future use.15 
 
American demands for compensation from Britain after 1865 were essentially ignored 
for nearly two years after the war,16 during which time Britain maintained that its 
neutrality had not been compromised.  Nevertheless, the emergence of the United 
States as a new world force, capable increasingly of inflicting damage on British 
interests, meant that the compensation claims made by the United States were not 
merely a challenge to British political and judicial interpretations as to its neutral 
obligations; the claims involved substantial and practical questions of international 
law and conduct.  As post-war proposals to change American neutrality laws 
contained various retaliatory elements which would have infringed British freedom of 
trade, Great Britain was convinced ultimately of the wisdom of adjudicating the 
financial claims arising from the ACW.  Most importantly, Britain agreed to arbitrate 
on the basis of rules which were not yet accepted as principles of general international 
law, and which clearly favoured the case of the United States from the outset.17 
 
The convening of the Geneva Arbitration to determine definitively, as between the two 
countries, the content of the laws of neutrality was also viewed as more appropriate to 
the times. There was otherwise a risk of ‘the exercise of force by bodies politic, for the 
purpose of coercion’.18  However, when the arbitrators awarded a gross sum in 
compensation to the United States on grounds that stated categorically which ‘rules’ 
of neutral duty had been breached by Britain, the inference was sealed that either 
British domestic laws had not been adequate to the task of ensuring compliance with 
international obligations, or the actual interpretation and application of the laws by 
British customs officers, the judiciary, and others, were somehow at fault.  Either 
way, Britain was found liable for its failure to ensure that its interpretation of the 
content of the laws of neutrality – and the commercial advantage to be secured 
through it - remained above reproach.   
 
                                              
14 Article VII of the Treaty of Washington, and specifically, ‘the claims of the U.S. 
against G.B. on account of acts committed by rebel cruisers’.  J.B. Moore, supra note 
4, p. 541. 
15 See statement of Lord Granville, quoted in id., p. 540.  
16 Id., p. 497. 
17 E. Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (Helsinki:  Academia 
Scientiarum Fennica, 1954), p. 505. 
18 Dana, supra note 9, p. 378 n. 171, who adds:  ‘[m]odern civilisation has recognised 
certain modes of coercion as justifiable’.  
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Naturally, the history of the Geneva Arbitration of 1872 has been recounted 
extensively elsewhere, but it is the specific purpose of this discussion to explore the 
conventional flexibility which propelled the development of the laws of neutrality for so 
long, and which was greatly circumscribed by the Geneva Arbitrators in 1872.  The 
structure of this discussion is as follows. First, the historical framework for the rules 
of neutrality is briefly outlined;  the primary emphasis is on the modern (post-1815) 
period19 in order to foreground the events that unfolded in 1861.  A short review of 
third state reaction to the outbreak of the ACW is then made. The opposing positions 
taken by Great Britain and the United States regarding the rights and duties of 
neutrality, and the course of the arbitration at Geneva, are then discussed.  It is 
concluded that, for reasons largely to do with the specific circumstances of the ACW, 
the finding of British liability in 1872 would mark the beginning decline of the laws of 
armed neutrality.    
 
2. The ‘Standardisation’ of Neutrality.   
 
By the mid-Nineteenth Century, a stance of neutrality was the best, if not the only, 
mechanism by which third states could avoid involvement in the wars of other states.  
It was also the case by 1861 that a neutral state could profit hugely from continued 
trade relations with one or both of the warring parties.  However, should geographic 
position or historic trade links lead in fact to the enjoyment by one belligerent of an 
advantage greater than that of another, any resulting perception of ‘un-neutral’ 
service could quickly endanger a neutral state’s more formal stance.  When coupled 
with the risk that an aggrieved belligerent might view ‘un-neutral’ activity as serious 
enough to provoke a wider war, the operation of the law of neutrality could only be as 
good as each state’s ability to police and enforce its own position within the rules.    
 
In other words, a certain ‘equality of arms’ was a pre-requisite to the success of any 
state’s particular neutral policies.  As mere expediency is often the key to action 
taken regarding the outbreak and resolution of any war, it is the purpose of this 
section to discuss in brief outline the background and framework of those rules of 
neutrality which were perhaps better ‘known’ by 1861, in order then to evaluate the 
level of actual consensus in existence between ‘civilised’ nations at that time.    
 
2.a. The Pre-Modern Era of Neutrality – An Overview.   
                                              
19 The writer is of course aware of the recent debates surrounding the conceptualisation of 
pre-modern/modern/post-modern, etc., periods.  See, e.g., A. Giddens, The Consequences 
of Modernity (Cambridge:  Polity Press, 1990).  However, engagement with those debates 
is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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The rules of neutrality, as they existed in 1861, were the direct result of the 
non-prohibition of war in international relations.  In terms of the development of the 
relevant rules, three stages are of crucial importance:  the demise by the Sixteenth 
Century of the ecclesiastic ‘just war’ doctrine, the growth throughout the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries of bi-lateral treaties of defensive alliance, and friendship 
and amity, and the advent during the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries 
of wars of national liberation.  While it is controversial to what extent the ancient 
world systematised warlike arrangements, the law of neutrality in its modern sense 
was largely unknown generally speaking until the last centuries of the Middle Ages.20 
As there could be no ‘legal’ basis for a stance of neutrality between states in the 
absence of any ascertainable body of international law and few shared rules for 
waging war, any attempt at a stance of neutrality, or rather, of non hostes, could only 
be viewed as a temporary political fact.21  Even then, the general practice, 
particularly where deemed necessary for geographic or economic reasons, was for 
third states to affiliate with, and/or provide assistance to, one of the belligerents.   
 
In time, the search for limits to the ‘right’ to use force was facilitated in Europe by the 
Christianity held increasingly in common, and ever-expanding commercial relations.22  
Older debates in the classical bellum justum which required the justification of war 
by reference to a ‘just cause’ thus constituted an attempt to assign war a place in the 
Christian theological and moral universe.23  However, new controversies incident to 
the discovery of the New World and the blood-filled exploitation of the Amerindians 
began to weaken the centuries-old ecclesiastic ‘just war’ doctrine, and the idea arose 
                                              
20 See E. Castrén, supra note 17, p. 12.   
21 A.P. Rubin, 'The Concept of Neutrality in International Law', in A.T. Leonhard (ed.), 
supra note 13, pp. 9 – 15. 
22 See, e.g., T.E. Holland, Studies in International Law (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1898), 
pp. 20, 40 – 58.  An example of standardisation is the ‘Consolato del Mare’, a work dating 
from the Twelfth Century but first published in 1474 in Barcelona, in Catalán.  See 
Morratiel V., ‘The Spanish School of the New Law of Nations’ [Sept.-Oct. 1992] 290 I.R.R.C. 
416, 424 – 425; H. Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America (New 
York:  Gould, Banks and Co., 1845, reprinted 1973), pp. 36 – 42, 106 – 107; H. 
Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. II (London:  Longmans, 7th ed. 
1952), p. 628 
23 ‘As such, it [the ‘just war’ doctrine] constituted an attempt to impose restrictions on a 
practice of recourse to force which was virtually endemic, and could not simply be 
outlawed given the fragility of the institutions’. P. Haggenmacher, ‘Just War and Regular 
War in Sixteenth Century Spanish Doctrine’ [Sept.-Oct. 1992] 290 I.R.R.C. 434, 437. 
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that those who lack a personal ‘just cause’ also lack the standing to fight, and could 
have no moral or legal grounds for resorting to arms or otherwise assisting a 
belligerent.24 This development lent a new rational basis to a formal stance of 
third-party neutrality during war which simultaneously diminished the importance of 
ideological justifications for war. Thus, neutrality could become an obligation.25  
 
Arguably more important than the gradual demise of the ‘just war’ doctrine, however, 
was the steady conclusion of treaties of ‘qualified’ neutrality which contributed to the 
emergence of a formalised stance of impartiality during war.26  In practical terms, 
waging war was expensive then, as now, and a stance of ‘qualified’ neutrality 
permitted a form of alliance, or amity, to be signalled simultaneously with the 
retention of non-combatant status. ‘Qualified’ neutrals were thus unlikely to find 
themselves automatically within the pool of warlike actors, yet retained their freedom 
to profit from war by agreeing in advance to furnish a belligerent with money, troops, 
and similar assistance. In this way, a ‘qualified’ neutral state could benefit more from 
the wars of others in commercial and economic terms than it would lose.27  Moreover, 
bi-lateral treaties of defensive alliance, and of commerce and amity, expired in due 
course, at which point participant countries were free to alter their prior mutual 
agreements, and to develop new conventional obligations.28  The resulting scope for 
manoeuvre and advantage meant however there was little evidence of the emergence 
of a ‘body’ of generally accepted rules of international law in this context.29 
 
The transition of Europe to industrialisation accompanied a slow but gradual 
centralisation of power in the hands of ever more powerful states.  This in turn 
                                              
24 See id.; H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, pp. 623 – 626; T.E. Holland, supra note 22, 
p. 52.   
25 A.P. Ruben, supra note 21, p. 14. 
26 Treaties of defensive alliance, and of commerce and amity, were used for this purpose.  
H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 663.  See also J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, pp. 3, 5 
– 7, 40 - 42.  
27 See H. Wheaton, supra note 22, p. 122, who notes a similar Dutch stance following the 
Peace of Westphalia. 
28 Id., p. 202. 
29 As in the case of seizure of private property at sea.  See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht (ed.), 
supra note 22, p. 460.  G.B. usually passed prize acts to meet each new war.  Dana, 
supra note 9, p. 392 n. 176.  Exceptions existed regarding other aspects of maritime 
neutrality, as well.  See H. Wheaton, supra note 22, pp. 106, 115, 206 – 217, 300 – 301, 
305; J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 46 (the Armed Neutrality of 1780); Dana, supra note 9, 
pp. 507, 508 n. 223.   
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altered the ‘equality of arms’ formerly held between smaller ‘state’ entities,30 and 
certainly by the Nineteenth Century, higher levels of ‘perfect’ or ‘impartial’ neutral 
obligations were demanded by belligerents.31 In turn, a more ‘perfect’ observance of 
neutrality required higher levels of ‘due diligence’ to maintain the demarcation 
between ‘neutral’ and ‘un-neutral’ service.  Industrial progress merely complicated 
inter-state relations during war in this regard, as growing lists of prohibited 
contraband constituted a warning of the coming erosion of neutral freedoms.  
Generally speaking, trade in warlike instruments such as munitions could be seized 
as prohibited contraband.  Gradually, as industrialisation began slowly to change the 
manner of waging war, articles declared contraband, and hence, forbidden to the 
enemy through belligerent seizure, came to include more everyday commodities such 
as pitch and tar, rosin, sail cloth, and even food, the acquisition of which could also 
prolong a war.32   While neutral nationals who continued to profit from trade in 
contraband articles did so at their own risk, neutral states became increasingly aware 
that to act in defence of private commercial interests against belligerent attack 
increased the risk of neutral state involvement in foreign wars.  
 
2.b. The Post-1815 Importance of Neutrality.   
 
The American position at Geneva in 1872, that the applicable laws of impartial 
neutrality 1861 – 1865 were well-known to ‘civilised’ states, was to some extent true.  
The four decades which elapsed between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the 
Crimean War (1853 – 1856) were ‘relatively calm from the point of view of war and 
neutrality’.33  The peace settlement in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars had 
                                              
30 Cf. the meaning of the term ‘state’ which Vitoria, writing in the mid-Sixteenth 
Century, characterised as ‘…for example, the kingdom of Castile and Aragon, the 
Republic of Venice, and the like …’.  Quoted in H. Wheaton, supra note 22, p. 37. 
31 E.g., the ‘right’ of neutrals to trade freely with each belligerent was increasingly drawn 
into question during the maritime wars of the Seventeenth Century.  Id., p. 121 n. ‘u’ 
(citing Jenkinson [Lord Liverpool], Discourse on the Conduct of Great Britain in Respect to 
Neutral Nations [1801], p. 48). 
32 Neutral trade in items such as food destined for areas under siege or blockade was of 
course always prohibited.  See, e.g., E. Castrén, supra note 17, p. 546; infra notes 55, 69.  
Article 10 of the 1766 Treaty between G.B. and Russia restricted contraband to ‘munitions 
of war’, which Article 11 defined as ‘canons, mortiers, armes-à-feu, pistolêts, grenades, 
boûlets, balles, fusils, pierres-à-feu, mèches, poûdre, salpêtre, soûffre, cuirasses, piques, 
épées, ceinturons, pôches à cartouches, sêlles et brides, au dêlà de la quantité qui peut 
être nécéssaire pour l’usage du vaisseau, etc.’.  H. Wheaton, supra note 22, p. 298 n. ‘u’. 
33 J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 106. 
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left Europe with first a ‘Holy Alliance’, and later, the ‘Concert of Europe’, of Great 
Powers pledged to act together to prevent the outbreak of war in their mutual 
relations.  In turn, the effects of this European defensive alliance were also felt in the 
Western Hemisphere.34  Verzijl35 thus attributes 1815, and the signing of the peace 
treaties to end the Napoleonic wars, as the end of the early period of neutrality.  After 
1815 the relative power and influence of the major European players altered; there 
was a re-balancing and consolidation of territorial control not seen since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. The Concert of Europe had charged itself with the task of 
mutually ensuring a Europe of peace and stability.  After the treaties of peace were 
signed at Paris in 1814 – 1815 between France on the one hand, and the other allied 
European powers of Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia on the other, the aim to 
secure Europe against future French military ambitions was considered complete.36  
Uneven developments in imperialism and industrial power continued apace, and 
fewer entities possessed sufficient war-making power to threaten and complete 
successfully an interstate conflict.  This meant a greater imbalance in state-to-state 
‘equality of arms’, fewer warlike actors, and fewer wars for conquest in Europe. More 
importantly, fewer ‘real’ warlike players meant fewer opportunities to challenge the 
more controversial neutral rights and duties.  The appearance of an increasingly 
strict approach to neutrality was facilitated.   
 
A new situation had also now to be confronted.  Questions of neutrality had begun 
by 1815 to arise – albeit rarely – in the case of full-scale civil wars, a phenomenon 
which was arguably the outgrowth of ‘popular guerrilla warfare’37 as waged by late 
Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Century national liberation movements in Europe.38 
One fairly logical consequence therefore of the post-1815 re-balance of power was that 
most European wars 1815 – 1870 were civil rebellions fought for some form or other 
of national liberation, rather than traditional inter-state war, properly so-called.39  
Moreover, the new system of intervention designed in 1815 reflected a resolve to 
                                              
34 E.g., that part of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ of 1823 preventing European intervention in 
American affairs.  See Dana, supra note 9, pp. 82 – 94 n. 36.  
35 J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 46. 
36 See H. Wheaton, supra note 22, pp. 423 – 445.  The Vienna Congress also declared 
slavery to be an ‘odious crime’.  Dana, supra note 9, p. 168. 
37 A phrase coined in relation to the doctrine of popular guerrilla insurgency for national 
liberation which ‘crystallised’ about l830 in Europe.  G. Best, supra note 2, p. 265.  
38 E.g., the American War of Independence, and the French Revolution. For a brief, but 
useful overview of the transition to ‘civil’ war between 1815 and 1870, see id., pp. 257 – 
295. 
39 One notable exception was the Crimean War. 
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maintain a new stewardship over the peace of Europe, and the Concert of Europe was, 
a fortiori, capable of extension to every revolutionary movement deemed to endanger 
the new social order.  In other words, the view was quickly formed that the Great 
Powers – which France re-joined in 1818 at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle – had in 
fact afforded themselves a perpetual pretext to prevent disruption to the newly 
re-established monarchical system.40   
 
Friction also resulted from so-called ‘mixed’ external-internal state conflicts.41 The 
collective efforts of the Great European Powers came in turn to be divided between 
those states which wished to nominate an ‘intervenor’ state and those which preferred 
to exercise more collective rights of interference. Thus, states continued to develop 
laws of neutrality, if only in order to make it less likely that the activities of their 
citizens might draw the neutral state into a war,42 and many began slowly and 
unilaterally to curtail particular activities of their nationals from the outset of a 
foreign war.43 To this end, each neutral state was faced with a choice:  it could either 
expressly prevent or prohibit various private activities during a foreign war, or it could 
challenge the actions taken by an over-zealous belligerent against its private neutral 
commercial activity.  As previously mentioned, the latter option required a 
considerable neutral ability to self-help, either through the possibility of strong 
diplomatic protest, or armed reprisals.  
                                              
40 H. Wheaton, supra note 22, pp. 517 – 519, 521.  This view led to the ‘Monroe Doctrine’, 
supra note 34.  See also A. Carty, The Decay of International Law (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 92; Q. Wright, ‘The American Civil War, 1861 – 
1865’, in The International Law of Civil War (R. Falk, ed.) (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
Press,1971), pp. 99 – 102. 
41 E.g., French intervention in 1822 in the Spanish revolution, Spanish intervention 
during the Portuguese constitutional crisis of 1826 and during the Portuguese civil war of 
1834, and the collective offer of assistance in the negotiated separation of the Netherlands 
and Belgium in 1830.  Wheaton notes that a show of Christian solidarity prompted action 
taken in the 1828 Greek Revolution by France, Britain, and Russia; this followed similar 
intervention in 1826 to place Greece under Western protection against the Turks.  H. 
Wheaton, supra note 22, pp. 560 – 563.  See also Dana, supra note 9, pp. 88 – 93 n. 36. 
42 See, e.g., H. Wehberg, ‘La Guerre Civile et le Droit International’ [1938] 63 Recueil des 
Cours 7, 85 – 89; J.H.W. Verziijl, supra note 3, pp. 106 – 109 (enactments passed 1818 – 
1849), ll4 - 115 (neutrality proclamations issued regarding the Austro-Sardinian/French 
war and the war between the Argentine Confederation and Buenos Aires, both in l859). 
43 E.g., the U.S. Neutrality Law of 20 April 1818, c. 88, S.8, 3 Stat. 449.  See A.P. 
Rubin, supra note 21, pp. 21 – 26; C.S. Hyneman, ‘Neutrality during the European 
Wars of 1792 – 1815 [1930] A.J.I.L. 279.  Cf. A. Carty, supra note 40, pp. 91 – 93. 
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As for the extension of neutrality laws to civil wars, the difficulty was that interstate 
war is one thing, but civil wars or insurrections, by definition, are generally matters of 
internal, domestic concern which at first sight appear to give far less scope to the 
issue of inter-state neutrality. The adoption of an ‘equal’, impartial approach towards 
revolutionaries fighting against their government was also more difficult to reconcile 
within the context of rules developed to maintain peaceful commercial relations 
during an inter-state war. Moreover, the conventional origins of neutrality made the 
extension of this area of law to civil wars difficult. Nevertheless, an analogous 
application of the rules of neutrality adopted for international wars was possible in a 
civil war context,44 as a formal stance of neutrality might just as easily be 
necessitated by the interruption of normal, bi-lateral, peacetime trade during a 
large-scale civil war, and awkward questions regarding the relevance of neutrality law 
to a ‘civil war’ could naturally await the war’s conclusion.45   
 
2.c. The Declaration of Paris 1856.   
 
In 1856, a major step towards the development of ‘known’ rules of neutrality was 
taken.  The Declaration of Paris, formulated at the end of the Crimean War, marked a 
new consensus among ‘civilised’ nations regarding in particular some of the most 
problematic aspects of maritime neutrality.  More importantly, this consensus in 
treaty form was evidence of a newly emerging commonality of attitude to the non-use 
of privateers in maritime warfare, a commonality which nonetheless would have little 
or no effect during the ACW, which followed soon after.   
 
By means of brief overview, the events which led to the Declaration were as follows.  
The Ottoman Empire had not been included in the system of public law established 
by the Congress of Vienna.46  While this fact generally did little to lessen the disputes 
which occurred between Russia and the Ottoman Porte throughout the early 
Nineteenth Century, the outbreak in 1853 of the Crimean War in the Black Sea 
between Russia on the one hand, and an uneasy alliance of Turkey, France, Britain, 
Prussia and Sardinia on the other, effectively destroyed the Holy Alliance.  The 
Crimean War thus led to a proliferation of neutrality declarations and similar decrees 
                                              
44 This is argued, for example, by J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 102. 
45 E.g., the uncertainty underlying the characterisation of the American Revolution, or 
‘War of Independence’. 
46 H. Wheaton, supra note 22, p. 556. 
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by those Powers which did not wish to participate.47  The content of these many 
proclamations differed mainly to the extent they each encompassed or stressed 
particular aspects of neutrality in reflecting various prior, bi-lateral agreements, 
which again highlights the importance of the conventional origins of neutrality law.48  
 
The belligerent powers also adopted specific policies towards the neutrals.  Most 
crucially, all the belligerents from the outset proclaimed voluntarily they would not 
issue letters of marque to privateers.49  Privateers, as private armed vessels awarded 
commissions (or, letters of marque) by a state,50 allowed a belligerent to increase its 
sea-power quickly.  However, privateers also had an unsavoury reputation, ‘as 
tending to encourage a spirit of lawless depredation’.51  The prohibition of letters of 
marque effectively prevented the use of privateers between the belligerents.   
 
At the war’s end, and despite variations in practice, the representatives of seven 
states52 assembled at the Congress of Paris in l856 to conclude the peace terms and 
to formalise various practices devised for the Crimean War.  In particular, they 
adopted as the last Act of the Congress the four rules of the Declaration of Paris 
Respecting Maritime Law.53   Article One abolished privateering between the 
signatories.54  Articles Two and Three provided for the commercial rights of neutral 
                                              
47 See J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, pp. 109 – 114, for citation to the relevant neutrality 
declarations and similar decrees. 
48 Id., p. 114. For example, G.B., which entered the war alongside France on 24 March 
1854, had earlier issued a proclamation which banned the fitting-out or equipping of 
warlike vessels in her ports. 
49 A ‘letter of marque’ was a privateer’s licence to commit acts of hostility. 
50 The term ‘privateer’ may refer both to a private vessel and its owner.  The privateer was 
officially licensed to seize and plunder enemy ships.  A term frequently used 
synonymously with that of ‘privateer’ in the literature of the time is ‘cruiser’, meaning a 
speedy warship. 
51 Dana, supra note 9, p. 380 n. 173, refers to the abolition of privateering in Article 23 of 
the U.S.-Prussian Treaty of 1785 (not renewed in the treaty in 1799), and to other efforts 
to abolish the practice in the early Nineteenth Century. 
52 Austria, France, Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. 
53 Reprinted in A. Roberts and R. Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1989), p. 24.  See also C.H. Stockton, supra note 9, pp. 356 – 368; 
H.W. Malkin, ‘The Inner History of the Declaration of Paris’ [l927] VIII B.Y.I.L. l.  
54 The Declaration of Paris is merely a compact between the signatories, which can 
only treat each other’s privateers as pirates.  Dana, supra note 9, pp. 380, 381 n. 173.  
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merchant ships during war.55  Article Four required blockades to be effective.56  The 
total number of parties to the Paris Declaration grew to fifty-one.  The United States 
did not join because, as a young country, it insisted it must remain able to call up 
privateers, a situation which would be re-thought at the outbreak of the ACW.57  
 
2.d. Privateering and the ACW. 
 
With the outbreak of the ACW in 1861, the issue of privateering leapt quickly to the 
forefront.  The first rule of the Declaration of Paris, which was applicable only 
between its signatories, had made it all the more clear that the conversion of 
merchant ships into warships was to be a controversial side-effect.58  The conversion 
of merchant ships, which were otherwise largely immune from attack, allowed states 
                                                                                                                             
The Declaration has never been formally abandoned.  A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra 
note 53, p. 23. See also H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 462 n. l. 
55 ‘Free ships make free goods, with the exception of contraband’ meant that neutral 
merchant ships were safe from capture or attack, even when carrying enemy goods (except 
contraband).  There was no attempt to define ‘contraband’ in the 1856 Declaration, as this 
was often left to the belligerents of each war.  See H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 
460 n. 3, adds that ‘only the neutral flag covers enemy goods, not the flag of a 
belligerent …’.  See also E. Castrén, supra note 17, p. 546. 
56 To be lawful denial, belligerent blockades had to be effective, in the sense of preventing 
access to an enemy coast.  An ineffective blockade or ‘paper’ blockade, and a ‘pacific’ 
blockade were considered acts falling short of war.  See F.E. Smith, supra note 8, pp. l46 - 
148; E. Castrén, supra note 17, pp. 290 ff.; T.E. Holland, Lectures on International Law 
(T.A. Walker and W.L. Walker, eds.) (London:  Sweet and Maxwell, 1933), pp. l30 - 150. 
57 See A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 53, p. 23; Q. Wright, supra note 40, pp. 80, 82, 
94 – 97; Dana, supra note 9, pp. 380 – 381 n. 173. A rejected American amendment to the 
Declaration provided for the complete immunity of all private property at sea not 
contraband. See, e.g., Article 23, Treaty of Friendship between the U.S. and Prussia, l785, 
quoted in H. Wheaton, supra note 22, p. 306.  See also H. Fujita, ‘Commentary:  1856 
Paris Declaration’, in The Law of Naval Warfare:  A Collection of Agreements and 
Documents with Commentaries (N. Ronzitti, ed.) (London:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), pp. 66, 
70; Dana, supra note 9, pp. 381 – 383 n.173.  See also H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 
22, p. 46l n. l (citing Smith, [1938] 63 Hague Recueil 624, [1939] 55 Law Quarterly Review 
237, and Rowson [1947] XXIV B.Y.I.L. 160, l66). 
58 The conversion of merchant ships into warships at sea was particularly controversial.  
Cf. A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 53, p. 79.  
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to fill gaps in regular navies almost as quickly as had privateers.59 The Southern 
Confederacy, which prior to secession did not have an independent navy, offered 
letters of marque to subjects of all countries by proclamation of Mr. Jefferson Davis, 
the President of the new Confederacy, on l7 April 1861. This meant the Southern 
Confederacy was in a position only to recognise Articles Two and Three of the 
Declaration. The Northern Federal Union quickly began negotiating to accede to the 
Declaration of Paris in its entirety a few days after this, but only on condition neutral 
third state signatories to the Declaration did not recognise the validity of Confederate 
letters of marque.60 
 
In turn, Lord Russell of the British government sent inquiries on 6 May 1861 to the 
French government regarding the means by which to obtain from each of the 
belligerents a formal recognition of Articles Two and Three of the Declaration.61 
British and French acceptance of a Confederate undertaking to observe only these two 
Articles meant in effect that the Confederacy would enjoy the advantages of 
commissioned privateers,62 which would not only increase the power of the 
Confederate naval forces, but also afford greater protection to blockade-runners.  
Continuing Federal assertions of sovereignty over Confederate territory further 
complicated this attempt at compromise. There was the risk Confederate privateers 
would be treated as pirates or public enemies by the United States, while receiving 
treatment as ‘legal’ belligerents by the other signatories of the Declaration.63  Such a 
                                              
59 J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflicts (London:  Stevens, l954), p. 576.  
Merchant ships converted into warships of the regular navy can thus be distinguished 
from privateers granted letters of marque.   
60 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 564.  After G.B. opened direct negotiations, the 
Confederate government in Richmond, Virginia, passed resolutions to declare the 
observation of the Second and Third Articles of the Declaration of Paris, ‘but to maintain 
the right of privateering …’ .  Id., p. 565. 
61 See id., pp. 563 – 4; Dana, supra note 9, pp. 380, 382 n. 173. 
62 See supra notes 49 – 50, and accompanying text; the U.S. ultimately declined to sign 
the Declaration.  Dana, supra note 9, pp. 380, 382 n. 173.  The Americans hinted in 
Geneva that such a Confederate advantage could have ‘unhappily force(d) the U.S. into a 
war with G.B.’.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 565.  Cf. H.W. Malkin, supra note 53, pp. 42 
– 43. 
63 In view of the dangers, ‘no avowedly foreign private armed vessels took letters of marque 
from the Confederate government’.  Dana, supra note 9, pp. 380, 383 n. 173. Congress 
authorised President Lincoln to issue letters of marque, but he declined to make use of 
this power.  Id., p. 382 n. 173. 
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result would be divisive as regards practice on the high seas, particularly with regard 
to belligerent rights of stop and search for contraband.  
 
The Confederates managed to fit-out by May 1861, or soon afterward, a number of 
armed vessels, mostly of small tonnage, which made a considerable number of 
captures.64  To complicate matters further, the anticipated success of Confederate 
blockade-runners in eluding the Federal blockade was accompanied by the extension 
of the doctrine of continuous voyage by the Federal authorities regarding the carriage 
of merchandise by neutral vessels.65  Even though neutral trade generally was 
prohibited if destined for areas under siege or blockade, Great Britain argued 
throughout the ACW that the Federal Union’s blockade was not ‘effective’, which in 
turn ‘offered extraordinary inducements to persons to attempt to elude it’.66  This 
meant in turn that the issue of ‘free ships, free goods (except contraband)’ became 
relevant.  The most simple case of the carriage of goods by neutral merchant ships 
occurs when the goods are taken directly to a belligerent port.  In view of the risks 
involved in running an enemy blockade, however ‘ineffective’, a more common method 
is to go first to a neutral port, off-load, pay import duties, and re-load the goods for 
ultimate transport or transhipment to the ‘real’ enemy destination. The second (or 
final) leg of the journey can of course be made by land or sea.  Ships papers reflect 
only the first, neutral port.  If stopped and searched mid-Atlantic and en route 
between neutral ports, the carriage of goods, or contraband for that matter, appears 
innocent.  
 
The presumption on the part of the Federal authorities that such ‘partial’ contracts of 
carriage must also imply a further, or final, destination was based on the principle of 
dolus non purgatur circuitu,67 and resulted in a ‘neutral’ consignor having a ‘paper 
duty’ to prove that the ultimate destination of his cargo was innocent.68  Moreover, 
the presumption that innocent trade carried on between two neutral ports would in 
fact result in supplies reaching the Confederacy in breach of the blockade led to 
incidents which did little to lower existing levels of Anglo-American tension, or to 
verify the existence of many ‘known’ rules of neutral duty during the ACW.  Thus, 
merchant ships which supplied either the Northern or the Southern states were 
entangled in a war on trade as much as were warships and privateers, as ship losses 
                                              
64 ‘These vessels were said to have taken from 60 to 70 prizes’.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, 
pp. 594 – 595.  
65 Practice in this respect began to alter before the Crimean War. H. Lauterpacht (ed.), 
supra note 22, pp. 814 - 820.   
66 J.B. Moore, p. 604.  See infra notes 156, 168, and accompanying text.  See also Article 
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fell into two basic categories:  privateers and warships lost in actual naval combat, 
and merchant vessels lost in attempting to run the blockade.69 In particular, a 
somewhat over-zealous Federal surveillance of British trading interests and practices 
nearly enlarged the war on many occasions, as is now discussed.  
 
3. The Outbreak of War 1861 – 1865:  an Overview of British Neutrality.  
 
The ACW was viewed factually, and from the outset, as an ‘international’ conflict, an 
event attributable neither to the automatic operation of treaties of alliance and 
defence, nor to gratuitous foreign meddling in internal state affairs.70 The war lasted 
from 13 April 186171 to 9 April 1865,72 ending in defeat for those Southern states 
                                                                                                                             
67 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 8l6.  See also J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 581; 
infra note 148, and accompanying text.  
68 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 46l.   
69 D. Stick, Graveyard of the Atlantic:  Shipwrecks of the North Carolina Coast 
(Chapel Hill:  University of N.C. Press, 1952), p. 50. The profit motive was crucial. For 
example, the acting ensigns of one blockading vessel received $9,589.67 each as their 
share from the sale of just one captured ship; the cabin boy of another received the 
equivalent of six years pay.  Id., pp. 64 – 65.  Cf. T.E. Holland, supra note 56, p. l3l n. 
l:  ‘no questions of “contraband”, or of “free ship, free goods”, are raised by the 
institution of a blockade, but for the fact that some members of Parliament seem to be 
of the contrary opinion’. As privately owned vessels, blockade runners were required 
by Confederate law to provide at least one-third of their cargo space for government 
stores.  They were ‘small, fast steamers, able to run past the blockading vessels 
under cover of darkness’, and operated largely between Nassau and Bermuda, and 
Wilmington, N.C.. D. Stick, above, this note, pp. 61, 63 - 64. 
70 See, e.g., J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. ll6.  Several Southern States began to discuss 
secession immediately upon the election of President Lincoln on 6 November 1860, due in 
large part to his known views on slavery.  See, e.g., D. Lazare, ‘America the Undemocratic’ 
[Nov. – Dec. 1998] 232 New Left Review 3, 16 – 22, for a discussion of the entrenchment of 
the institution of slavery in the U.S. Constitution of 1787, which benefited wealthy 
planters.  In 1861, fewer than 25% of the 1.6 million white households in the South 
owned slaves, no more than 3% owned more than 20, while only 3,000 planters owned 
more than 100.  Id., p. 17 n.30 (citing R.C. Heilbroner and A. Singer, The Economic 
Transformation of America:  1600 to the Present (1984), pp. 127 – 128). On 31 January 
1865, the U.S. Congress finally voted by 119 votes to 56 for the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolishing slavery, after which the draft amendment was sent to the states for ratification.  
71 The date of the fall of Fort Sumter, at Charleston, South Carolina.  Between the election 
of President Lincoln, and the fall of Fort Sumter, the states of South Carolina, Alabama, 
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which had seceded from the Union to form a break-away Confederacy. Although the 
Southern defeat was predictable to the extent it conformed with the principle that 
‘superior force, sooner or later, decides everything’,73 a military victory by the 
Northern Federal Union was not always assured.74   
 
Crucially, the United States alleged throughout those four years that Great Britain’s 
declaration of neutrality on 13 May 1861 had been ‘premature’, and that the 
Confederates were thereby ‘encouraged’ to continue fighting.75 There were also many 
points throughout the rebellion when Federal accusations were made regarding many 
alleged breaches of Great Britain’s declared neutrality.  By the end of the war in 1865, 
Anglo-American relations were at their worst since l8l4.76 The sections which follow 
are limited to factual circumstances faced by neutral third states which are of crucial 
importance to an understanding of the bases for British liability in Geneva in 1872.  
 
3.a. Neutrality and Civil War in the Context of the ACW. 
 
The United States President, Abraham Lincoln, effectively asserted a state of 
belligerency77 on 19 April 1861 when he declared a maritime blockade of the Southern 
coastline,78 an international act which should not be confused with a municipal 
decree of closure which does not involve the international consequences of neutrality 
law.79  So far as Great Britain, the first state to proclaim neutrality,80 was concerned, 
                                                                                                                             
Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas announced their secession from the 
Union.  See J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 561 – 562.  
72 The date of the Confederate surrender in Appomattox, Virginia.   
73 G. Best, supra note 2, p. 275. 
74 Stick credits Southern cotton production for the Confederate ability to fight four 
years of war. D. Stick, supra note 69, p. 60.  
75 See infra, notes 120, 131, and accompanying text. 
76 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 495. 
77 See The Prize Cases [1862] 2 Black 635; the Hiawatha [1862] 2 Black 676. 
78 South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, and 
extended 27 April to North Carolina and Virginia.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 594; 
J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 116.  The blockade stretched about 2500 nautical miles, 
and was universal in the sense it was impartially applied.   H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra 
note 22, pp. 770 - 77l. 
79 T-C. Chen, The International Law of Recognition (London:  Stevens, 1951), p. 384. 
The blockade was characterised as being ‘for the purpose of collecting the revenue in 
the disturbed part of the country, and for the protection of the public peace, and of 
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the proclamation of blockade automatically triggered the law of neutrality for third 
states. The French government issued its declaration of neutrality on l0 June 1861; 
the Queen of Spain followed on l7 June; the Dutch Government81 declared neutrality 
in the same month, followed by the Emperor of Brazil on l August. Neutrality 
declarations, the content of which all varied in accordance with past state practice, 
were also issued by Prussia, Denmark, Belgium, Russia, Portugal, Hawaiian Islands, 
Bremen, and Hamburg.82   
 
As mentioned previously, the practice of applying rules of neutrality during a civil war 
was a relatively new one which developed analogously within a slowly emerging 
consensus in Europe as to the neutral practices required between ‘civilised’ nations.  
Moreover, predictions regarding the expected extent and scale of the ACW, as well as 
general uncertainty concerning the Constitutional legality of the secession by the 
Southern states,83 led neutral third states quickly to regard the war as a full-scale 
belligerency rather than a domestic insurgency. While there has never been any 
general ‘right’ to a recognition of belligerency during a civil war, such a recognition is 
possible when a de facto state of affairs disturbs international peace, neutral trade, 
and diplomatic relations to a significant degree. A stance of neutrality in accordance 
with known conditions of fact is better substantiated. Thus, while a rebellious 
non-state belligerent generally lacks the legal, or de jure, qualification to wage war, a 
belligerent community can be treated by analogy as if it were a ‘sovereign state’ once 
its actual ability to wage war correctly is recognised.84  To gain, or be accorded, a 
contemporaneous, third state recognition of war, rebels needed, among other things, 
to demonstrate   
 
                                                                                                                             
the lives and properties of quiet and orderly citizens’, until Congress could meet on 4 
July.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 562. 
80 J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. ll5.  See Dana, supra note 9, pp. 439, 440 n. 208, 
regarding the general regulations of all British ports, and special regulations for the ports 
in the British West Indies.  
81 For example, Dutch neutrality instruments excluded privateers from Dutch ports, 
prohibited privateering by Dutch nationals, and prescribed the observance of neutral 
duties by Dutch commerce.  J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. ll5. 
82 See J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 595, regarding the many declarations, decrees, or 
notifications issued by maritime powers. 
83 For a recent discussion of the ACW as a ‘second American revolution’, see, e.g., D. 
Lazare, supra note 70, pp. 17 – 20. 
84 T-C. Chen, supra note 79, pp. 304 – 306 (citation omitted); Dana, supra note 9, pp. 29, 
30 n. 15. 
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… [T]he existence of a de facto political organisation of the  
insurgents, sufficient in character, population and resources, to  
constitute it, if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably  
capable of discharging the duties of a state; the actual employment  
of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with the  
rules and customs of war, such as the use of flags of truce, cartels,  
exchange of prisoners, and the treatment of captured insurgents  
by the parent state as prisoners of war; and, at sea, employment  
by the insurgents of commissioned cruisers, and the exercise by  
the parent government of the rights of blockade of insurgent ports  
against neutral commerce, and of stopping and searching neutral  
vessels at sea.  If all these elements exist, the condition of things is  
undoubtedly war; and it may be war, before they are all ripened  
into activity.85 
 
In such a situation, belligerency should be recognised,86 the result of which was of 
course to trigger the laws of neutrality, and the outbreak of the ACW presented the 
community of nations with just such a de facto state of affairs.   However, as a 
parent government might never concede to its rebels any recognition of ‘true’ 
belligerency,87 third states were faced also with the practical consequences of their 
attitude to the ACW.88  Foreign recognition of civil war as ‘belligerency’ carried the 
risk of diplomatic rupture, as third states which were sufficiently powerful both to 
recognise the civil war and to enforce their neutral rights effectively transformed the 
                                              
85 Dana, supra note 9, pp. 29, 30 n. 15.  The Confederacy had formed a government, 
commanded territory, and possessed organised armed forces.  See also T-C. Chen, supra 
note 79, pp. 312 – 332; The Prize Cases [1862], supra note 77, p. 670. 
86 See H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, pp. 248 – 249; L. Moir, ‘The Historical 
Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflict 
to 1949’ [1998] 47 I.C.L.Q. 337.  Cf. C. Greenwood, ‘The Concept of War in Modern 
International Law’ [1987] 36 I.C.L.Q. 283; J.L. Kunz, ‘Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale’ 
[l95l] 45 A.J.I.L. 528. 
87 Chen notes that the term ‘recognition of belligerency’ was unknown in the literature 
before 1856.  T-C. Chen, supra note 79, p. 337 (citing W.L. Walker, ‘Recognition of 
Belligerents and Grant of Belligerent Rights’ [1937] 23 Grotius Transactions 178 – 179). 
88 While some writers take the view that the recognition of belligerents is an act of 
unfettered political discretion, H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 250 n. 2 (citations 
omitted), third state recognition may be viewed as ‘a gratuitous demonstration of moral 
support to the rebellion, and of censure upon the parent government’. Dana, supra note 9, 
pp. 29, 30 n. 15. 
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‘rebels’ into de facto belligerents for purposes of international consumption.  In this 
way, neutral self-help was an essential ingredient of the law of neutrality, yet a 
decision to recognise belligerency in the face of parent government opposition was and 
remains a serious matter.   
 
3.b. Neutral ‘Due Diligence’ and British Practice. 
 
The degree of neutral state ‘due diligence’ required to maintain an attitude of 
impartiality toward belligerents in 1861 varied in accordance with prior diplomatic 
practice, economic links, geographical position, and the ability of each neutral state to 
self-help.  Above all, ‘due diligence’ was largely a function of neutral state necessity.89 
Therefore, any evidence of states adopting neutral policies designed, inter alia, to 
prohibit private individuals from supplying war material or loans of any kind to a 
belligerent90 could also be viewed as a function of that state’s ability to self-help. In 
other words, as powerful states were in a better position to enforce their vision of ‘due 
diligence’, many of the operative and largely self-regulatory rules of neutrality at the 
time continued to exhibit some interesting distinctions.  In turn, the issue of whether, 
and to what extent, additional, self-imposed neutral state duties, assumed unilaterally, 
might be indicative of an emerging consensus in approach among ‘civilised’ nations 
would arise at the Geneva Arbitration.   
 
For example, it was a generally held view that a neutral State could choose whether or 
not to place itself under a duty to repress trade in armaments, even though a stance 
of state neutrality was not compromised by such trade; it was in any event the 
practical duty of an opposing belligerent to police it. Britain’s own proclamation of l3 
May l86l, which ‘recalled’ the prohibitions laid down in the Foreign Enlistment Act of 
3 July l8l9,91 had little or no effect beyond the strict confines of the twelve articles of 
this l8l9 instrument, which were aimed primarily at preventing three things:  foreign 
enlistment, the premeditated equipping of armed ships for use in a war against a 
belligerent which was at peace with Britain, and the reinforcement of belligerent 
                                              
89 Cf. H. Wehberg, supra note 42, p. 89; T-C. Chen, supra note 79, pp. 366 – 367. 
90 For specific reference to so-called ‘real’ neutrality programmes l8l5 - l907, which lay 
down precise rules for the behaviour of government and citizen alike towards 
belligerents, see J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, pp. l04 – 147. 
91 59 Geo. iii. c. 69 (in force 6 June by proclamation).  Dana, supra note 9, pp. 448, 450, 
471 – 473 n. 215. This Act was replaced by the Foreign Enlistment Act of 9 August l870.  
See J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. l07 (citation omitted). 
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warships in British waters without Her Majesty’s licence.92  Thus, Britain did not 
prohibit its citizens from supplying arms to the Confederates, and the British 
government was involved in armaments transactions with Commission agents for both 
sides. 93  Moreover, while it was illegal in both the United States94 and Great Britain95 
for private individuals to raise loans to assist rebels fighting the government of a 
friendly foreign state, elsewhere the issue could turn on the charging of a reasonable 
rate of interest.96   
 
Nevertheless, Britain had to prohibit separately on l June 1861 the bringing into 
British waters of captured vessels and cargoes by belligerent warships and privateers 
in order to preserve British neutrality.  In January l862, Britain instructed its 
Admiralty to prevent hostilities occurring in British waters.  Warships of both parties 
were admitted in British harbours on an equal footing within the confines of British 
                                              
92 The latter two prohibitions were to prove the most difficult to monitor, and are excerpted 
in pertinent part as follows:   
VII.  ... [I]f any Person, within any part of the United Kingdom ... shall ... 
equip, furnish, fit out, or arm ... any Ship or Vessel, with intent or in order that such 
ship or Vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince ... as a Transport 
or Store Ship, or with intent to cruise or commit hostilities against any Prince ... or 
against the Subjects or Citizens of any Prince ..., with whom Her Majesty shall not 
then be at War; or shall ... issue or deliver any Commission for any [such] Ship or 
Vessel ..., every Person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour ...;  
VIII. ... [I]f any Person in any part of the United Kingdom ... shall, by adding 
to the number of the guns of such Vessel, or by changing those on board for other 
guns or by the addition of any equipment for War, increase or augment ... the 
warlike Force of any ship or Vessel of War, or Cruiser, or other armed Vessel ... in 
the service of any Foreign prince ..., every such person so offending shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanour ... . 
[Emphasis added.]  See infra notes 123, 132, 145 - 151, and accompanying text. 
93 This principle held firm at the Geneva Arbitration, where there was no complaint 
regarding the sale of military supplies or arms in the ordinary course of business.  See 
infra note 180, and accompanying text.  
94 Kennet v. Chambers [1852] l4 Howard 38.  
95 De Wütz v. Hendricks [1824] 11 State Trials 125, 9 Moore 586.  See also F.E. Smith, 
supra note 8, p. l33.  
96 The issue of private loans to a belligerent was less clear. F.E. Smith, supra note 8, 
p. 133; H. Lauterpachht (ed.), supra note 22, pp. 743, 847.   
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practice at the time,97 but the most serious difficulties arose between the United 
States and Great Britain for the latter’s alleged negligence in permitting Confederate 
warships to be built in and depart from British ports.98 Despite the evidence in 
support of many American allegations that Confederate cruisers were being built and 
equipped in British territory, the English courts refused to convict so long as the ships 
concerned remained in British waters,99 or on departure, remained ‘incapable of 
attack and defence’.100 Accusation and counter-accusation thus flew between the two 
governments regarding whether, and to what extent, the British presumption of a 
ship’s innocence was a breach of neutral duty.  
 
British shipbuilders thus were under no legal obligation to inquire into the use to 
which a vessel might be put.101  Instead, the suspect ships would sail from a British 
port, and complement or assemble their equipment, armament and manning 
elsewhere, even if actually obtained from their port of departure.  For example, the 
Alabama, regarding which many of the claims made in Geneva were to arise,102 was  
constructed for Confederate use in Liverpool in l862, equipped and armed on the 
coasts of neutral Terceira (Azores) with the help of two vessels from Britain, the 
Agrippina and the Bahama.  The Alexandra was released in l863 in Liverpool with 
incomplete equipment. The Confederate ship Florida was constructed in Liverpool, 
supposedly for the Italian Government under the name Orebo, and provided with a 
crew, provisions and armaments with the help of a British vessel, the Prince Alfred, at 
Green Cay.  The Shenandoah departed from London as an ordinary merchant ship, 
the Sea King, and was later converted to a Confederate cruiser near the island of 
                                              
97 Known as the ‘24 hours rule’, a gap of 24 hours must separate the exit of two opposing 
belligerent ships from a neutral harbour.  E. Castrén, supra note 17, pp. 520, 525. 
Further provisions extended to matters such as the requirement of leave to enter the ports 
of Nassau, and other Bahama Islands. J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, pp. 119 – 120. 
98 The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 did not expressly prohibit the construction of 
ships.  See infra note 150. See also D. Stick, supra note 69, p. 61 (‘[s]o great was the 
exodus of steamers from the Clyde to blockade-running activities that the Times, of 
London, said in 1863: “Should the demand continue at this rate, there will soon be 
scarcely a swift steamer left on the Clyde”’); E. Castrén, supra note 17, p. 505. 
99 J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. ll9. 
100 F.E. Smith, supra note 8, p. l37; Dana, supra note 9, pp. 450, 470 n. 215 (discussion 
of the issue of intent in this context), and pp. 450, 474 - 478 n. 215. 
101 See Atty. Gen’l. v. Sillem and Others [1863] 2 Hurlstone and Caldman 43l; cf. The 
British Consul v. The Ship Mermaid, Bee's Am. Adm. Rep. 69.  See also E. Castrén, supra 
note 17, p. 505. 
102 Eighteen claims would become known as the ‘Alabama claims’. 
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Madeira; she augmented her crew at Melbourne.103  In response, the United States 
government took the view, over continuing protest from Britain, that a suspect ship 
might consist of illegal contraband, was destined ultimately for the Confederacy, and 
hence was presumed to be in breach of the blockade.104  American cruisers thus 
began to search for and seize vessels destined for or merely en route to Nassau and 
other neutral ports.   
 
Further examples abound of disagreement over neutral rules which extended from 
isolated cases of friction105 to more specific matters, and regarding which there was 
no real consensus in practice, and a great deal of correspondence. Moreover, there 
were many points at which Britain and the United States nearly went to war. The 
profits of shipbuilding and blockade-running meant that Confederate personnel and 
agents were welcome in British ports, giving rise to Federal apprehension that Britain 
would accord full diplomatic recognition of Confederate independence. Strategic and 
economic considerations such as industrial links with Southern cotton106 and concern 
over the territorial integrity of Canada107 further complicated the Anglo-American 
diplomatic scene. British protests were voiced regarding the pursuit of American 
deserters into Canadian territory, and the enlistment in Canada of men to serve in the 
Federal army.  In short, evidence was present of the difficulties encountered by the 
neutral third state which finds itself in geographical and/or trade proximity to both 
warring parties.108  
 
3.c. The ‘Trent’. 
 
The United States alleged throughout the war that the neutral policies adopted by 
Great Britain in regard to the Confederates were generally inadequate, and 
constituted proof of negligence, if not of an active intent to assist the rebels. In turn, 
the United States was accused throughout the conflict of interfering with ‘peaceful’ 
                                              
103 J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, pp. ll8 - 119; F.E. Smith, supra note 8, p. l37. 
104 See supra note 67, and accompanying text; H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 8l9. 
The general rule was that a carrying vessel which was deemed ignorant of the ultimate 
destination of the cargo could not itself be seized - only the cargo. Id., p. 785 n. 4 (citations 
omitted). 
105 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 843. 
106 Stick notes that cotton sold for approximately eight cents per pound in Southern 
ports, about eighty cents in Europe, and for about one dollar in the Northern states. D. 
Stick, supra note 69, p. 61. 
107 See, e.g., Q. Wright, supra note 40, pp. 78 - 82. 
108 See J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. ll6. 
P
st-Pri t
 24 24 
British trade, and of a somewhat overly-prescriptive attitude to the rights and duties 
of neutrality.  The vigilance of the American navy in policing sections of the blockade 
of the Southern ports thus led to many incidents in which normal British maritime 
intercourse could be disrupted.109  As early as the latter part of November 1861, 
Britain prepared herself to go to war with the United States as a result of what she 
considered to be a belligerent act of war against one of her ships – the Trent - by the 
Federal navy.110 The problem, in a diplomatic nutshell, was the unlawfulness of 
belligerent ‘trespass’ on neutral British shipping, the peaceful conduct of which 
should not have given offence.111 
 
The incident occurred as follows.  The carriage of enemy persons or despatches was 
considered an un-neutral service by the two states when carriage was on a neutral 
vessel for, or on behalf of, the enemy.  Even then, enemy persons and/or despatches 
could not be seized validly from a neutral vessel unless the neutral vessel itself was 
also seized, and the incident investigated properly by a court, as the complicity of the 
ship’s captain required proof. When four Confederate officials, charged with a 
quasi-diplomatic mission to Britain, were seized by an American steamer from the 
British mail boat, the Trent, which travelled between the two neutral ports of Havana 
and Nassau,112 there was no evidence that the commander of the Trent had in any 
way colluded with the Confederate government. As the vessel was allowed to continue 
her voyage, the seizure of the men was deemed illegal.113  The act of stopping a 
British vessel, and of seizing passengers (whom the American government, but not the 
British, regarded as ‘contraband of war’), was felt to be an act of unaccountable 
aggression against British neutrality, particularly in view of the fact that the seizure 
occurred in the Bahaman Channel.  Moreover, the fact that the men were 
                                              
109 Large sections of the Southern ports were effectively neutralised by Federal forces 
by 1863.  Stick notes that ‘[a]t one time there were three separate lines of blockading 
vessels past which the [blockade-running] steamers had to go; one some forty miles at 
sea, a second approximately ten miles out, and a third close to shore’.  D. Stick, 
supra note 69, p. 62.  See also Q. Wright, supra note 40, pp. 90 – 93.  
110 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 9, pp. 534, 539 – 553 n. 228; E. Castrén, supra note 17, pp. 
570 – 571. 
111 The twin issues of ‘continuous voyage’ (the Trent’s destination was not a hostile port) 
and the uncertain lawfulness of the seizure of persons as ‘contraband’, were very much in 
contention.  Dana, supra note 9, pp. 534, 546, 548 - 553 n. 228. 
112 The four men had succeeded in running the blockade in fast steamers to Havana.  
From Nassau, they were to transfer to one of a regular line of steamers to England. Id., pp. 
534, 540 n. 228. 
113 J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. ll6; H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 843. 
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subsequently released did little to assuage wounded British pride over this breach of 
her sovereignty, and the British government began to despatch troops to Canada, and 
to prepare vessels.   
 
Of perhaps more crucial importance, Dana notes in this context that  
 
At this time, the United States was straining its utmost efforts to  
subdue a rebellion of gigantic proportions.  Its navy was not then  
sufficient to blockade the entire Southern coast, and its armies  
were slowly gathering from the people; and all, and more than all  
the forces collected were required for the civil war.  It was well  
understood that the necessity of preparing to meet England at that 
 moment, in even a probable or possible war by sea and land,  
would require the raising of the blockade, the withdrawal of a large  
part of our troops from the Southern frontier, and, substantially,  
the leaving of the Confederates to a de facto independence.  A war,  
of course, made them the allies of England, and secured their  
recognition as a sovereignty. … .   
[A]s things stood, it did not require actual war with England to  
compel the raising of the blockade, and the withdrawal of the chief  
part of the army from the South, thus effecting the success of the  
rebellion and the severance of the Republic.114  
 
As one example of the ease with which a belligerent could over-step its perceived 
‘rights’ and breach those claimed by neutrals, provoking a wider war, the Trent is 
illustrative. By early December 1861, however, the British government received the 
apologies and remedial action it had demanded, and the ‘Trent crisis’ was diffused.  
 
4. The Arbitration at Geneva.   
 
After the war’s end in April 1865, the British Law Officers urged the British 
government to end wartime relations, which it did on 2 June.  On 23 June, the 
blockade was raised by Presidential proclamation, and by October, relations of peace 
were fully restored between the two countries.115  Uneasy negotiations began soon 
after to arbitrate Britain’s alleged infractions of the laws of neutrality and, in 
particular, complaints about British shipbuilding for the Confederates.  The British 
                                              
114 [Emphasis added.]  Dana, supra note 9, pp. 534, 547 - 548 n. 228. 
115 T-C. Chen, supra note 79, p. 395 (citations omitted).  Chen adds that ‘this is a simple 
case where fact and law coincided’.  See also Q. Wright, supra note 40, p. 86. 
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government, too, had claims, and negotiations went on for some years.  It was finally 
agreed to adjudicate their differences before an Arbitration Tribunal situated in 
Geneva.116  The parties entered into the Treaty of Washington on 8 May l87l for this 
purpose, and the award was made by the five-member Tribunal on l4 September 
l872.117  
 
To abbreviate somewhat the facts underlying the agreement to arbitrate, the British 
were unwilling for some time to allow the issue of British liability for the depredations 
of Confederate cruisers to go forward, though the government was prepared to express 
official regret for the damage caused.  Moreover, the British government had modified 
their Foreign Enlistment Act in 1870 in such a way as to conform generally with the 
rules the arbitration would employ, but this did not obviate the fact that such rules 
which now were new to the domestic law had not, in the British view, formed part of 
the law of nations during the ACW.  Therefore, the fact that British liability in Geneva 
would hinge on the fundamental issue of ‘due diligence’, or as the British preferred to 
characterise it, the ‘good faith and honesty’ with which the British had observed 
neutral duties, did little to assuage apprehension regarding the ultimate definition to 
be ascribed to this term.  
 
Moreover, and in order to prove British negligence, the ‘theory’ of the American case 
would rest on allegations of hostile British government ‘animus’, in the sense of an 
inclination to ignore international obligations so as to ‘affect their [H.M. Government’s] 
own course, (and) affect the action of their subordinates’.118 This meant generally that 
the British would face allegations that the government did not act with ‘due diligence’ 
(yet to be defined), and related allegations that the law officers of the Crown did not 
properly understand, and hence, properly interpret, the Foreign Enlistment Act.  
However, to the extent that proof of hostile ‘animus’ might depend on a particular 
interpretation of individual acts which under normal circumstances form no part of 
the formal duty of neutral non-discrimination,119 such as the establishment of 
                                              
116 Treaty of Washington of 8 May l87l, supra note 4.  G.B., the U.S., Brazil, Italy, and 
Switzerland each chose one arbitrator:  Sir Alexander Cockburn (G.B.), Mr. C.F. Adams 
(U.S.), Mr. J. Staempfli (Switz.), Baron (later Viscount) d’Itajuba (Brazil), and Count Sclopis 
di Salerano (It.).   
117 The award is printed in full in J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 653 - 659.   
118 Id., p. 592. 
119 See id., p. 661.  The duty of non-discrimination means the duty to treat belligerents 
formally, not materially, on the basis of equality, and thus does not cover activities such as 
neutral state expressions of sympathy with one belligerent and disapproval of the other.  
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Confederate agencies in England, the open favouritism shown to the Confederate 
cause by the great commercial houses of Liverpool, or public pronouncements which 
speculated on the improbability of the re-establishment of the Union, the British 
showed little concern, and ignored these latter completely. 
 
The breadth of issues which was raised between the United States and Great Britain 
both before and during the Geneva Arbitration is wide in scope and detail, and it is 
the purpose of this section therefore to confine it as follows.  First, the extent of the 
damages claimed by the United States is outlined, after which the operative rules of 
the arbitration are given.  The structure and merits of the case are then sketched, 
with particular attention given to the issues of ‘due diligence’, the ‘Alabama claims’, 
and the claims for compensation.  The award is then placed in context. 
 
4.a. The Assessment of Damages. 
 
The claim against the British government after the war was estimated by Senator 
Sumner, the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
to be in the region of $l5 million.  In a speech to the Senate on 13 April 1869, he 
added the following estimates regarding damages due to the nation 
 
… The loss may be seen in various circumstances:  as, in the rise  
of insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the carrying trade,  
which was one of the greatest resources of our country; the  
diminution of our tonnage, with the corresponding increase of  
British tonnage; the falling off in our exports and imports, with due  
allowance for our abnormal currency and the diversion of war.  
…  Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was a  
further loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this branch of  
industry, which an intelligent statistician puts at 5% annually,  
making in 1866 a total loss on this account of 1,384,953 tons,  
which must be added to 1,229,035 tons actually lost.  The same  
statistician, after estimating the value of a ton at $40 gold, and  
making allowance for old and new ships, puts the sum total of  
national loss on this account at $110 million.  Of course this is 
only an item in our bill.  … .  No candid person ... can doubt that 
the rebellion was originally encouraged by hope of support from 
England, … .   Not weeks or months, but years, were added in this 
                                                                                                                             
A. Gioia, ‘Neutrality and Non-belligerency’, in International Economic Law and Armed 
Conflict (H.H.G. Post, ed.) (Dordrecht:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), p. 81 n. 107. 
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way to our war, so full of costly sacrifice.  … .  Besides the 
blockade, there was the prolongation of the war.  The rebellion  
was suppressed at a cost of more than $4000 million, a  
considerable portion of which has been already paid, leaving $250 
millions as a national debt to burden the people.  If, through  
British intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or  
in any way extended, as can not be doubted, then is England justly  
responsible for the additional expenditure to which our country 
was doomed ... .120      
 
Most of these allegations pertain to the cost of waging war on commerce, with ship 
losses falling into the two main categories of warships and merchant ships.121  Many 
of the heads of damage indicated in this speech by Senator Sumner were in fact 
impossible to quantify.  Termed the so-called ‘indirect’ or ‘national’ claims, they 
unfortunately captured the mood of the time.  In turn, these claims were to prove 
problematic at the Geneva Arbitration.  
 
4.b. The Three Rules of Washington. 
 
The rules of neutral duty,122 which were made the law of the tribunal by mutual 
agreement, were inserted in Article VI(1) of the Treaty.  Termed the Three Rules of 
Washington, they were as follows: 
   
That a neutral government is bound –  
First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or  
equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has  
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war 
against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use like  
diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any  
vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel 
having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such  
jurisdiction, to warlike use.123 
                                              
120 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 511 - 512.  The speech was received as formulating the 
demands on which the future negotiations of the U.S. would be based.  It also set the 
standard of public expectation.  See also F.E. Smith, supra note 8, p. l37. 
121 See supra note 69, and accompanying text.  The main allegations concerned those 
British-built ships which caused damage. 
122 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 547   
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Secondly.  Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of  
its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the  
other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military 
supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. 
Thirdly.  To exercise due diligence in its own ports or waters, and,  
as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of 
the foregoing obligations and duties.  
 
In consenting to arbitrate in accordance with these three ‘known’ rules of neutral duty, 
Britain expressly declared in Article VI(2) of the Treaty that  
 
Her Britannic Majesty has commanded her High Commissioners 
and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty’s Government  
cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of the  
principles of International Law which were in force at the time  
when the claims mentioned in Article I arose,124 but that Her  
Majesty’s Government, in order to evince its desire of  
strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries and  
of making satisfactory provision for the future, agrees that in  
deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of  
those claims, the Arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty’s  
Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in  
these rules.   
And the High Contracting Parties agree to observe these rules as  
between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge  
of other maritime Powers, and to invite them to accede to them.125 
 
Thus, Great Britain agreed to arbitrate the Alabama claims in accordance with rules it 
expressly maintained were not operable from 1861 – 1865, largely because future 
Anglo-American relations were dependent on such co-operation.  This made it all the 
                                                                                                                             
123 The British had objected strongly to the inclusion of ‘construction’ of a vessel in 
the prohibition against ‘fitting out, arming, or equipping’ contained in the draft First 
Rule of Washington as too broad.  Id., p. 542.  See also supra notes 95 - 96. 
124 The so-called ‘Alabama claims’.  
125 An earlier statement read as follows.  ‘It being a condition of this undertaking that 
these obligations should in future be held to be binding internationally between the two 
countries’.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 544; J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, pp. ll7 - 118; H. 
Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 7l5. 
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more crucial to distinguish differences in position as to the correct interpretation of 
these rules, as would be done throughout the thirty-two meetings subsequently held.   
 
4.c. The Structure and Merits of the Case. 
 
The United States opened the six chapters of its case with a brief synopsis of the 
provisions of the Treaty regarding the Alabama claims.126  The second chapter, 
entitled ‘The unfriendly course pursued by Great Britain towards the United States 
from the outbreak to the close of the insurrection’, detailed the allegedly ‘unfriendly’ 
British acts.127  The third chapter of its case was entitled ‘the duties which Great 
Britain, as a neutral, should have observed toward the United States’.128  The fourth 
chapter was entitled ‘Great Britain failed to perform its duties as a neutral’.129  The 
fifth chapter of the American case concerned Britain’s failure to perform the duties of 
a neutral by tracing the origin and career of each of the Confederate cruisers. The 
sixth and final chapter dealt with the American claims for compensation.130 
 
To prove ‘animus’, the United States emphasised the following:  (1) the premature 
British recognition of the belligerency;131 (2) British collusion with France regarding 
the Declaration of Paris; (3) British refusal to amend its domestic neutrality laws on 
American request; (4) British lack of ‘due diligence’ in preventing the departure from 
Liverpool and other domestic ports of Confederate warships and rams132 built and/or 
                                              
126 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 560. 
127 Id., pp. 560 – 566.  An over-arching theme was thus proof of British ‘animus’. 
128 Id., p. 567 - 580. 
129 Id., pp. 580 - 589 
130 Id., pp. 589 – 591. 
131 The U.S. alleged that British recognition occurred ten days prior to official receipt in 
London of President Lincoln’s proclamation of blockade. Owing to British opposition on 
this point, it was not expressly included in the terms of reference for the tribunal.  T-C. 
Chen, supra note 79, p. 382 [citation omitted]. 
132 ‘Rams’ or ‘iron-clad rams’ were specially designed ships of war, the first and most 
famous of which were the Merrimac (an iron-clad former schooner, renamed the 
Virginia by the Confederates) and the Monitor (a new type of Federal gunboat 
equipped with a revolving turret).  The Confederates commissioned several iron-clad 
rams, while the Federals completed more than thirty monitors.  D. Stick, supra note 
69, p. 53. 
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equipped there; (5) British conduct in the affair of the Trent;133 (6) the hospitality 
allegedly enjoyed on British soil by Confederate government administrative bureaux; 
and (7) a desire for Confederate success allegedly expressed by British government 
ministers.134  
 
These were of course serious allegations, against which Great Britain defended itself 
as follows.  An exposition of the subject matter of the arbitration as ‘understood’135 
was followed by a statement of propositions of international law with which, it was 
urged, British policy had been consistent.136  In synopsis, the duty of a neutral 
government is first to act impartially toward the belligerent powers.  Secondly, a 
neutral power is bound to recognise maritime commissions issued by each belligerent, 
and the captures made by each.  Moore records the next British proposition as 
follows: 
 
Where either belligerent is a community or body of persons not  
recognised by the neutral power as constituting a sovereign state,  
commissions issued by such belligerent are recognised as acts  
emanating, not indeed from a sovereign government, but from a  
person or persons exercising de facto, in relation to the war, the  
powers of a sovereign government.137 
 
Ever conscious of the American need to prove ‘animus’, the chronology of events 
leading to Britain’s recognition of the belligerency was then detailed, as based on 
British awareness, inter alia, of the secession movement after the election of President 
Lincoln.138  In other words, the British proclamation of neutrality, issued l3 May 
1861, was not premature, but, instead,  
 
                                              
133 The circumstances of which nearly brought the British into the war in 1861, as did the 
use of the British legation in Washington to forward correspondence to Richmond, Virginia. 
J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 564.  See supra Section 3(C). 
134 Examples of which are detailed in J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 566. 
135 I.e., claims regarding the Alabama, the Florida, the Georgia, and the Shenandoah. 
136 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 593 – 4. 
137 Id., p. 593. 
138 Id., pp. 594 – 595.  See also The Prize Cases [1862], supra note 77 (large-scale 
insurrection constitutes war in the legal sense), aff'd. in Thorington v. Smith [l868] 8 Wall. 
l, Williams v. Bruffy [l877] 96 U.S. l76, Ford v. Surget  [l878] 97 U.S. l0l8, and Baldy v. 
Hunter [l897] l7l U.S. 208.  Cf. Editorial Comment, Borchard ‘“Neutrality” and Civil Wars’ 
[l937] 3l A.J.I.L. 304. 
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[W]as published fourteen days after the receipt in London of the  
news that Fort Sumter had been reduced by bombardment, that  
the President of the United States had called out 75,000 men, and  
that Mr. Jefferson Davis had taken measures for issuing letters of  
marque; twelve days after receipt of intelligence that President  
Lincoln had published a proclamation of blockade; nine days  
after a copy of that proclamation had been received from Her  
Britannic Majesty’s consul at New York, and three days after the  
same proclamation had been officially communicated to Her  
Majesty’s secretary of state for foreign affairs by the United States  
minister, Mr. Dallas.139   
 
The third part of the British case concerned the issue of international rights and 
duties.140  The British case then dealt with specific ships built in British shipyards 
allegedly for the Confederate navy and against which the United States made its main 
complaints.141 In view of their importance to the future course of the law of neutrality, 
the respective positions assumed by each party, regarding (1) the content of ‘due 
diligence’, and (2) British shipbuilding, now follow.  
 
4.c.i. The Issue of Due Diligence. 
 
The American case outlined what was felt were ‘the duties which Great Britain, as a 
neutral, should have observed toward the United States’.142  Moore notes the 
American position, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
The United States understand that the diligence which is called for  
by the rules of the Treaty of Washington is a due diligence – that is,  
a diligence proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the  
dignity and strength of the power which is to exercise it; a diligence  
which shall ... prevent its soil from being violated; a diligence that  
shall ... deter designing men from committing acts of war upon the  
soil of the neutral against its will, and thus possibly dragging it  
into a war which it would avoid; a diligence which prompts the  
neutral ... to discover ... acts forbidden by its good faith as a  
neutral, and imposes upon it the obligation, when it receives the  
                                              
139 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 594 - 595. 
140 Id., pp. 599 - 604. 
141 Id., pp. 605 – 611. 
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knowledge of an intention to commit such acts, to use all the  
means in its power to prevent.  No diligence short of this would be  
“due”; that is, commensurate with the emergency or with the  
magnitude of the results of negligence. … .143 
 
As this statement reveals, the American position shifts the responsibility to police 
neutrality onto the neutral in proportion to that neutral’s enforcement abilities.  This 
clearly imposes a high burden on powerful states.  Moreover, the aim of this stance 
was largely to introduce American criticism of British municipal law which permitted 
Confederate ship-building.   
 
In defence, the British case emphasised the minimal, and largely undefined, 
standards of neutral conduct in pertinent part as follows 
 
Due diligence on the part of a sovereign government signifies that 
measure of care which the government is under an international  
obligation to use for a given purpose.  This measure, where it has  
not been defined by international usage or agreement, is to be  
deduced from the nature of the obligation itself, and from those  
considerations … on which the law of nations is founded. The  
measure of care which a government is bound to use in order to  
prevent within its jurisdiction certain classes of acts, from which  
harm might accrue to foreign states or their citizens, must always  
(unless specifically determined by usage or agreement) be  
dependent, more or less, on the surrounding circumstances, and  
can not be defined with precision in the form of a general rule.  … . 
Thus, the rules which exist in Great Britain … differ, from those  
which exist in France, Germany, or Italy. … [A]nd foreign states  
can not justly complain of this unless it can be clearly shown that 
these rules and modes of procedure conflict in any particular with  
natural justice, or, in other words, with principles commonly  
acknowledged by civilised nations to be of universal obligation.144   
 
In other words, and in the absence of a specific obligation, it was the duty of the 
belligerent to police neutrality. 
 
4.c.ii. The ‘Alabama’ Claims. 
                                              
143 [Emphasis added.]  Id., pp. 572 – 573. 
144 [Emphasis added.]  Id., pp. 600 – 601.  
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The United States next gave details of specific breaches of British neutrality, instances 
of which included the open operation in Liverpool of branches of the Confederate 
Departments of War, Navy and the Treasury,145 contracts made for the construction 
and purchase of Confederate ships in exchange for future crops of Southern cotton,146 
and the exchange of Confederate cotton for cargoes of arms and war munitions 
transhipped from Liverpool. 147   As a result, it was alleged, British colonial 
authorities had ‘converted the port of Nassau into an insurgent port, which could not 
be blockaded by the naval forces of the United States’.148  
 
An account of shipbuilding in Liverpool for the Confederacy followed.  First discussed 
was the Alabama149 which escaped from Liverpool in May 1862 after orders were sent 
for her arrest.  Then, in March 1863, the gunboat Alexandra was launched at 
Liverpool, but subsequently seized by Liverpool customs officers on 5 April and 
prosecuted under the Foreign Enlistment Act. The special jury returned a verdict in 
favour of her owners. As reported by Moore, the American case made the following 
points regarding the Court of Exchequer’s interpretation of the statute: 
 
... [T]hough her hostile character was clearly proved, ... [t]he judge  
said that a neutral might make a vessel and arm it, and then offer  
it for sale to a belligerent; that, a fortiori, “if any man may build a  
vessel for the purpose of offering it to either of the belligerent  
powers, … may he not execute an order for it?”150  That “to ‘equip’  
is ‘to furnish with arms’; in the case of a ship especially, it is ‘to  
furnish and complete with arms’; that ‘equip’, ‘furnish’, ‘fit out’, or  
‘arm’ all mean precisely the same thing”; ... “the question is  
whether you think that this vessel was fitted.  Armed she certainly  
                                              
145 Confederate agents were also established in the British West Indies. ‘Purchases made 
in England were sent to Nassau in British bottoms and were there trans-shipped into 
steamers of light draft and great speed, constructed for the purpose, …’.  Id., p. 581. 
146 Id., pp. 580 – 58l.  See also D. Stick, supra note 69, p. 61. 
147 Coal was also a problem, even though it was not listed as contraband.  J.B. Moore, 
supra note 4, pp. 581 – 582. 
148 Id., p. 581. Lord Palmerston had countered:  ‘it would not do for U.S. ships of war to 
harass British commerce on the high seas under pretence of preventing the Confederates 
from receiving things that are contraband of war’.  Id., p. 583. 
149 The assumption was that the Alabama was a duly commissioned warship.  T-C. Chen, 
supra note 79, p. 382. 
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was not, but was there an intention  that she should be finished,  
fitted, or equipped in Liverpool?  Because, gentlemen, I must say,  
it seems to me that the Alabama sailed away from Liverpool  
without any arms at all; merely a ship in ballast, unfurnished,  
unequipped, unprepared; and her arms were put in at Terceira,  
not a port in Her Majesty’s dominions.  The Foreign Enlistment Act  
is no more violated by that than by any other indifferent matter  
that might happen about a boat of any kind whatever”. 
 
The American case concluded:  ‘this ruling was not reversed, and stood as the law of 
England till after the close of the civil war’.151  The case then proceeded to two 
ironclads152 regarding which Britain risked war.153  The American case then shifted 
to the history of army purchases and blockade-running, and complained that 
Confederate ships were welcomed in British jurisdiction until l5 March 1865.154  The 
origin and career of British-built Confederate cruisers were then outlined.155  
 
The British defence was fairly short and to the point:  the blockade was so ‘imperfect’ 
it created a situation in which it was profitable to build ‘a certain class of ship’.156  
Moreover, commerce in contraband carried through the blockade constituted an 
‘enterprise( ) which Her Majesty’s Government could not undertake to prevent, and 
the repression of which belonged to the United States as a belligerent power’. Britain 
                                              
151 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 586. The Crown’s application for a new trial failed.  The 
bill for costs and damages was £3,700, as the ship had been held by customs for three 
years.  The ship later cost British colonial government more than £300.   Id., p. 606.  
See also Dana, pp. 471 n. 218, 474 – 477; infra note 170. 
152 See supra note 132. 
153 British unwillingness to intervene constituted grounds for war between the U.S. and 
G.B.. J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 587. 
154 Id., p. 589. 
155 Specifically, the Sumter, the Nashville, the Florida and her tenders, the Clarence, 
the Tacony, the Archer, the Alabama and her tender the Tuscaloosa, the Georgia, the 
Tallahassee (or the Alustee), the Chickamauga, and the Shenandoah. 
156 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 604 – 605. Cf. the U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier opinion 
in The Santissima Trinidad [1822] 7 Wheaton 283, at 340 (Mr. Justice Story): 
...[T]here is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens 
from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale.  It 
is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit; and which only 
exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation. 
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had banned the dismantling and sale of belligerent warships in its ports.157 The 
British Orders of 1 June 1861, and 3l January 1862 were noted,158 and described as 
‘more stringent and comprehensive than those of any other neutral government’.159 
 
With regard to specific American complaints about ship-building, with the exception 
of the Florida and the Alabama, the British case asserted it had investigated in every 
case.160  Where reasonable evidence161 was produced, the vessel was seized, and 
proceedings instituted, but the government had been unable to sustain seizure in all 
cases due to insufficient evidence, erroneous information, or changes in 
circumstances subsequent to government surveillance.162 The ironclad rams remained 
under seizure from October 1863 until May 1864.  The British government bought 
them for £220,000 to prevent their use by the belligerents.  Finally, Britain had to 
beware of ‘mere peculiarities in construction’ which led to mistaken inferences, 
‘especially in cases where the vessel is constructed with a view to some employment 
which, though commercial, is out of the ordinary course of commerce’.163  
 
4.c.iii. Claims for Compensation. 
 
The American claims for compensation were divided into two classes:  (1) direct losses 
growing out of the destruction of vessels and their cargoes by the ‘insurgent’ 
                                              
157 On the other hand, ‘it was not the duty of a neutral government to prohibit the sale in 
its territory of a ship owned by a belligerent to a neutral purchaser’. J.B. Moore, supra 
note 4, pp. 597 - 598. 
158 See supra Section 3(B), text. 
159 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 596. 
160 E.g., the Canton/Pampero was seized 10 December by Glasgow customs collectors, 
declared forfeit in April 1864, and remained under seizure until the war’s end.  The 
British government was unable to establish reasonable suspicion in 1864 regarding the 
Amphion and the Hawk, and in 1865 regarding the Virginia, the Louisa Ann Fanny, and 
the Hercules.  Id., p. 606. 
161 ‘By reasonable evidence is understood testimony which, though not conclusive, offered 
nevertheless a reasonable prospect that the government might be able, when the time for 
trying the case should arrive, to sustain the seizure in a court of law’.  Id., p. 608. 
162 See supra note 92, and accompanying text. 
163 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, pp. 607 – 608. The British case then described its efforts to 
prevent ‘the Anglo-Chinese Flotilla’ falling into Confederate hands. 
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cruisers,164 and (2) national expenditure pursuing those cruisers, the transfer of 
commercial sea traffic to the British flag, higher insurance costs, and the prolongation 
of the war, which increased costs generally.  There then followed a detailed statement 
of the cost of pursuing Confederate cruisers, estimated at $26,101,907.31, exclusive 
of interest.165  No estimate was given to the tribunal regarding the so-called ‘national’ 
or ‘indirect’ claims.166  Otherwise, the American case by the terms of the Treaty asked 
for interest to the day when the award was payable – twelve months after the date of 
award, at 7% interest (the legal rate in New York); 1 July 1863 was suggested as an 
‘average day’ from which to compute the interest.167 
 
Moore reports that Britain contended strongly that ‘there were no grounds on which 
the United States could maintain a claim for pecuniary indemnity’: 
 
… [A] charge of injurious negligence on the part of a sovereign  
government, in the exercise of any of the powers of sovereignty,  
must be sustained on strong and solid grounds.  ... .  It was not  
enough to show that a government had acted on an opinion from  
which an arbitrator could be induced to dissent; or that a  
judgement pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, and  
acted upon by the Executive, was tainted with error ... .  On the  
contrary, it was necessary to show that there had been “a failure to  
use, for the prevention of an act which the government was bound  
to endeavour to prevent, such care as governments ordinarily  
employ in their domestic concerns, and may reasonably be  
expected to exert in matters of international interest and  
obligation”… . ... (I)t was not reasonable “that a belligerent state ...  
should ... claim indemnity from the neutral for losses ... which it  
had not actively and diligently exerted itself to prevent and  
                                              
164 Including the (a) destruction of vessels and property of the U.S. Government; (b) 
destruction of vessels and property under the American flag; and (c) damages or injuries to 
persons, growing out of the destruction of each class of vessels’.  Id., p. 589. 
165 This sum comprised two principal items: $ 7,080,478.70 (incurred in cruising against 
Confederate ships), and $19,021,428.61 (the amount, including increased war premiums, 
claimed for the seizure, detention, and destruction of vessels by Confederate cruisers).   
166 Supra, note 120, and accompanying text. This issue, first formulated by Senator 
Sumter, threatened to derail the entire proceedings, and the Geneva Arbitrators were 
asked to declare that the indirect claims were non-justiciable.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, 
pp. 643 – 646; J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 118. 
167 J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 590. 
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arrest”.168  
 
The British position thus relied throughout on the rationale for the rights and duties 
of traditional neutrality law:  the belligerent must police the carriage of contraband as 
the belligerent was responsible for the disruption of normal peacetime trade. 
 
4.d. The Award. 
 
The tribunal re-convened in mid-June 1872 to receive the written arguments from 
each side, at which point Britain requested an eight months adjournment in order 
that the two governments could devise a supplementary treaty.  The source for such 
late British discontent was the so-called ‘indirect claims’, and American attempts to 
trace these claims back to the allegedly ‘premature’ British recognition of the war.  
Although ultimately settled without the need for further adjournment, the controversy 
surrounding the ‘indirect claims’ so nearly ruptured the proceedings that the British 
arbitrator, Sir Alexander Cockburn, professed himself to be unprepared when the 
tribunal re-convened in mid-July to consider the facts, the general principles of law, 
and the case of each cruiser.  When the reading of opinions did get underway, on 17 
July, further ‘special argument’ was allowed, prompted in each case by the British 
arbitrator, which concerned, inter alia, the meaning of ‘due diligence’, the recruitment 
of men for the Shenandoah at Melbourne, the entry of the Florida into the port of 
Mobile, the question of interest, and the general subject of the statement of claims.169   
 
As discussed above, Great Britain agreed to arbitrate on the basis of the Three Rules 
of Washington, even though these rules were not yet accepted as principles of general 
international law.  These rules clearly favoured the American case from the outset, 
and Britain expressly maintained they were not operable from 1861 – 1865.  In turn, 
the award made clear that neutral ‘due diligence’ ‘ought to be exercised … in exact 
proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a 
failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on their part’, and that a violation of 
neutrality had occurred with the ‘construction, equipment, and armament’ of vessels. 
As for American attempts to prove hostile British ‘animus’, the consensus of the 
tribunal seems instead to have been that the British were guilty only of failures of 
‘watchfulness’, in that the ‘feebleness in certain branches of the public service 
resulted in great detriment to the United States’.   
 
                                              
168 [Emphasis added.]  Id., pp. 610 - 611. 
169 Id., pp. 632 - 646, 649 - 650.  See supra note 166. 
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As for the ships, the arbitrators held the British government liable for the acts of the 
Alabama,170 the Shenandoah,171 the Florida,172 and four tenders.173  On the other 
hand, no liability was found regarding the Sumter and the Nashville,174 the 
Retribution,175 the Georgia, the Tallahassee, and the Chickamauga.176  The award of 
a gross sum of $l5,500,000 was reached on 2 September by a majority of 4 votes to 1; 
Sir Alexander Cockburn, the British arbitrator, dissenting. Double claims were 
disallowed, as were claims for ‘gross freights’ insofar as they exceeded ‘net freights’.  
Interest was disallowed for the costs incurred in pursuing the Confederate cruisers, 




Issues of public order and organisation are frequently solved by means of the use of 
armed force,178 and the ACW was no exception.  The war proved to be a long and 
costly dispute, not merely due to the countless sufferings of the American peoples, but 
also in terms of the many values which had to be re-cast forcibly.  Widespread 
system change was the result. Various doctrines and theories were effectively 
                                              
170 Unanimous with regard to Rules I and III, adding ‘the (British) Government … 
cannot justify itself for a failure in due diligence on the plea of insufficiency of the 
legal means of action which it possessed’. 
171 By 3 votes (Adams, Staempfli, Sclopis) to 2 (d’Itajuba, Cockburn), in respect of Rules II 
and III, and regarding acts committed after February 1865, prior to which the Tribunal 
was unanimous that no liability attached. 
172 By 4 votes (Adams, Staempfli, Sclopis, d’Itajuba) to 1 (Cockburn), in respect of all three 
Rules. 
173 The Tuscaloosa (the Alabama), and the Clarence, Tacony and Archer (the Florida).  
The Tribunal was unanimous that such auxiliary vessels ‘must … be submitted to the 
same decision’.  See J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 118. 
174 Unanimous. 
175 By 3 votes (Cockburn, d’Itajuba, Sclopis), to 2 (Adams ‘yes’ (all acts); Staempfli ‘yes’ (for 
the loss of the Emily Fisher)). 
176 Unanimous. Claims also made against the Sallie, the Jefferson Davis, the Music, the 
Boston, and the V.H. Joy, were excluded for lack of evidence. 
177 The Tribunal allowed interest at 6% per annum in gold.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 
651 n. 1.  Sir Alexander Cockburn refused to sign the award.  His dissent was published 
in a supplement to the London Gazette of 24 September l872, and by the U.S. government 
in [l872] IV(2) For. Rel. 48, as a note to Protocol No. XXXII.  See J.B. Moore, supra note 4, 
pp. 652, 659 – 661; J.H.W. Verzijl, supra note 3, p. 118.  
178 See T-C. Chen, supra note 79, p. 422. 
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overthrown during the war; others were elevated to unprecedented heights.  In the 
latter category are found the laws of maritime neutrality, construed through the 
perspectives, first, of known discrepancies in third state neutral practice during civil 
wars, and secondly, of levels of impartial ‘due diligence’, perceived neither as uniform 
nor ‘due’ from self-declared and largely self-regulating neutral third states.  
 
The Three Rules of  Washington carried merely conventional authority at the time,179 
but Lauterpacht asserts they were ‘the starting-point of the movement for the 
universal recognition’ that neutral impartiality places burdens on neutrals to prevent 
their subjects from supplying belligerents.180  Admittedly, the terms for arbitration 
put a non-British construction upon the term ‘due diligence’, i.e., the diligence ‘due’ to 
a belligerent must be proportional to the risks that belligerent would otherwise 
incur.181  More controversially, perhaps, the Geneva Arbitration marked the 
beginning of a more cautious approach to neutrality generally, and declarations of 
neutrality would hardly ever again be made in connection with a civil war.182   
 
The British approach to freedom of trade during others’ wars supported a 
fundamental, commercial proposition: a neutral government need only extend equal 
                                              
179 F.E. Smith, supra note 8, p. l38. 
180 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 7l6.  The Geneva Arbitrators did not alter the 
rule that vessels could be built, etc., for a belligerent within the territory if neither 
commissioned directly nor made ready for immediate hostilities.  F.E. Smith, supra note 8, 
p. l39.  Cf. H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, p. 7l4 (a ‘hair-splitting’ distinction); A.P. 
Rubin, supra note 21, p. 21 – 25; F.J. Merli, Great Britain and the Confederate Navy 1861 
– 1865 (Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 1970), pp. 235 - 249.  Geneva also did 
nothing to disturb private neutral trade in armaments.  See, e.g., J.H.W. Verzijl, supra 
note 3, pp. ll6, 166; E. Castrén, supra note 17, p. 505.  The U.S. conceded also that the 
Second Rule of Washington applied only ‘to the use of a neutral port by a belligerent for 
the renewal or augmentation of such military supplies or arms for the naval operations 
referred to in the rule’.  J.B. Moore, supra note 4, p. 575. 
181 H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 22, pp. 757 – 758, who also argues that for purposes 
of international law, the accepted meaning of ‘due diligence’ is ‘such diligence as can 
reasonably be expected when all the circumstances and conditions of the case are taken 
into consideration’.  See, e.g., Article 8 of Hague Convention XIII, l907, reprinted in A. 
Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 53, pp. 86 – 89, which substitutes the words ‘to use due 
diligence’ with ‘to employ the means at its disposal’.  
182 E.g., the San Domingo rebellion (1864), two Cuban rebellions (1870, 1875), the Carlist 
rebellion in Spain (1874), the Balkan rebellion (1878), the Columbian revolt (1885), and 
the Brazilian rebellion (1893).  
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facilities to each belligerent, for instance to purchase coal and other supplies, or to 
undergo repairs. This meant that many British citizens profited hugely from the ACW, 
and from the ‘known’ laws of neutrality to which Great Britain adhered.  The British 
position on the enforcement of neutrality was beneficial to its ship-builders, 
armaments manufacturers, and cotton industries, to name a few. The British 
government remained unwilling, until pressured so to do, to intervene in the 
commercial activities of its citizens, a stance nonetheless which could easily have 
threatened British neutrality, given the geographical proximity of British colonial ports 
to the American coastline, and the historic trade routes located there. 
 
In a similar vein, the British stance had its strategic dimension:  a divided United 
States, coupled with a new Confederate ally, might be no bad thing.  Great Britain’s 
status and early position on the issue of neutrality during the ACW obliged the United 
States to exercise greater caution on the high seas, despite the latter’s view that 
Confederate privateers were mere pirates.  Britain established diplomatic contact 
with the Confederate government in Richmond, Virginia, and conceded its awareness 
that its colonial ports were important to the Confederacy as a result of the blockade. 
Last, but by no means least, Britain followed the traditional rationale of neutrality law 
and left the policing of the carriage of contraband to the belligerents.  
 
Thus, the position in which the United States appeared to find itself regarding certain 
modes of neutral trade during the ACW was not dissimilar to that of belligerents in the 
pre-modern era of neutrality when faced with a stance of non hostes, which also 
meant that a certain ‘equality of arms’ was a pre-requisite to the success of any state’s 
particular neutral policies.  Particular ‘rules’ of neutrality were made operative 
through modes of neutral and belligerent self-help.  The content of neutral rules 
could only be as good as each state’s ability to police and enforce its own position 
within them.  The rules of neutrality therefore were a function of given circumstances, 
and hence, inherently flexible.   
 
The shift, after Geneva, of a greater degree of responsibility onto neutral states to 
prevent certain types of private trade with one belligerent to the detriment of the other 
gives a valuable insight into the award of compensation made to the United States in 
Geneva. The United States won the war.  British concerns regarding its future 
colonial trading interests were clearly in evidence when it agreed to arbitrate on the 
basis of rules it denied were in force during the ACW. Moreover, the formulation of 
American claims for compensation after the war reflected that country’s growing 
strength and ability to enforce its own version of the applicable ‘rules’. With the rapid 
approach of ‘total war’, however, the distinction between neutral and un-neutral 
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service would be made practicably meaningless, making it irrelevant, if not impossible, 
to sustain neutral burdens.  Soon, a new belligerent war aim of transforming ‘Neutral 
Countries’ into ‘Supply Centres’, the practical consequence, would be but a step away. 
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